



Ibrahim, from Gambia in Agadez, Niger. Credit: Pablo Tosco/Oxfam

AN EMERGENCY FOR WHOM?

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – migratory routes and development aid in Africa

In 2015, the EU and its member states set up the ‘EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’ to promote stability and economic opportunities and to strengthen resilience. An Oxfam analysis of all the projects approved under the instrument shows that the instrument’s flexible nature has generated both opportunities and risks, and lacks sufficient checks and balances to ensure that European interests do not take precedence over the needs of the people that aid is intended to help.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2015, in response to the dramatic increase in the number of people crossing the Mediterranean to claim asylum in Europe, the European Union created a new €2bn fund to address multiple aspects of migration along the so-called 'Central Mediterranean route'. The '*European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*' (EUTF for Africa) was adopted within the framework of the Valletta Action Plan, in connection with the European Agenda on Migration.

The EUTF for Africa was designed as an emergency instrument,¹ to '*respond to the different dimensions of crisis situations by providing support jointly, flexibly and quickly*',² complementing political dialogue, development cooperation programmes, humanitarian assistance and crisis response assistance. Seventy-three percent of its funding comes from the European Development Fund (EDF) and 20 percent from the EU budget, including money for development and humanitarian aid and funds for neighbourhood policies and home affairs. Seven percent comes from member state contributions and other donors. It is managed by a Strategic Board and three Regional Operational Committees: Horn of Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad and North Africa.

It has been recognized that effective responses to crises can benefit from flexible strategic multi-year funding that breaks down the silos of humanitarian response and long-term development assistance. However, the launch of the EUTF for Africa within the context of the European migration agenda raised concerns among NGOs that aid would be used to promote European interests.

Oxfam's analysis has been conducted almost two years after the Valletta Summit on Migration at which the EUTF for Africa was launched. It places each project approved under the EUTF for Africa in one of four categories, based on its objectives, results and indicators, as reported to the European Commission. The categories used for this report are:

- Migration management (migration containment and control, policy reform for returns, population registration systems, awareness raising and facilitated migration);
- Security, peacebuilding, preventing and countering violent extremism (P-CVE);
- Development cooperation; and
- Research and monitoring.

Oxfam's analysis finds that the EUTF for Africa provides much needed support to displaced people and creates opportunities for economic development. At the same time, however, some of its projects respond to a European political sense of urgency to stop irregular migration to Europe. The EUTF for Africa must adopt clearer procedures and more transparent and consultative processes to ensure that short-term interests do not jeopardize the long-term objectives of development, stability, poverty eradication and the protection of rights.

Currently, European governments expect to see the results of quick fixes where there are no quick solutions. The focus of the EUTF for Africa on *‘stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’* involves both short- and long-term responses to very different situations that have not been properly distinguished. The ability of individuals to travel across borders to engage in trade and labour in a safe and regular way is important for their economic resilience, as well as for their communities of origin and host communities. People who are displaced from their homes by crises such as conflict, persecution and disasters should be supported along their journey. The root causes of their displacement should be addressed for the benefit of all those affected by crises – not only those who are able to flee.

The European migration agenda is prevalent throughout the EUTF for Africa, and a considerable portion of its funding is invested in security measures and border management. Such measures will not meet governments’ expectations of stemming irregular migration and should not be expected to achieve this goal. To ensure that interventions funded from the EUTF for Africa do no harm and are conflict-sensitive, the flexible funding must be balanced with adequate accountability mechanisms, in line with humanitarian and development aid principles. Security measures should always be conflict-sensitive and be designed to promote the security of individuals, with a focus on the needs of women. This is particularly important when supporting the security forces of third states.


The effectiveness of the EUTF for Africa as a whole should be measured by its overall contribution to the gradual transition from humanitarian to development interventions relating to displacement, and to the promotion of ‘resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management,’ as per the instrument’s objective.

The EUTF for Africa is a new aid modality and it is setting the trend in development financing. It is the responsibility of the European Commission, the member states, and other donors to ensure that accountability measures relating to project selection and spending are sufficient to address accountability and transparency concerns relating to flexible pooled funding.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Based on the categories proposed in this report, Oxfam found that 22% of the EUTF for Africa budget is allocated to migration management, 13.5% to security, peacebuilding and P-CVE, 63% to development cooperation and 1.5% to research and monitoring. The details of most projects are accessible online, but the process by which they are adopted and implemented falls short in terms of transparency and inclusive consultation.

Figure 1: Funding allocation, EU Trust Fund for Africa



Development cooperation projects are mainly implemented in countries which the EU views as countries of migration origin, and are far less present in countries of transit. Migration management and support for security forces are the main focuses in countries of transit.

A positive contribution

Despite certain problematic approaches, the EUTF for Africa supports many positive initiatives that should be further explored and built on as a way of bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and longer term development; building the resilience of the most vulnerable populations, creating economic opportunities and increasing participation in local governance.

Civil society organizations should be able to take an active and propositional role in project development stages by being able to submit proposals for new projects. Their capacities and expertise in the humanitarian and development fields can balance political agendas. Oxfam is implementing four programmes funded by the EUTF for Africa: in Chad, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Mali. The experience and lessons learned of Oxfam and other organizations can help in directing the instrument's approach and the development of new projects.

However, it is essential that funding allocated to programmes specifically targeting migrants or migratory routes is *additional* to budgets to address urgent humanitarian needs and existing development aid commitments, in line with national poverty reduction strategies.

Migration management

Within the €400m allocated to migration management, most projects are designed to restrict and discourage irregular migration through migration containment and control (55% of the budget allocated to migration management); raising awareness about the dangers of irregular migration (4%) and implementing policy reforms for returns (25%); and improving the identification of countries' nationals (13%). Only a meagre 3% of the budget is allocated to developing safe and regular routes.

These results show that the approach of European donors to migration management is far more geared to containment and control. This falls short of their commitment under the Valletta Action Plan's second pillar, to 'promot[e] regular channels for migration and mobility from and between European and African countries' or Strategic Development Goal target 10.7, to 'facilitate orderly, safe and responsible migration and mobility of people'.

Without sufficient investment in opening more safe and regular mobility pathways – both within Africa and towards Europe – the EUTF will not only fail to achieve its goals for development, but also its migration-related policy goals. Rather than leading to a reduction in migration, restricting irregular migration will simply force migrants to take more dangerous routes.

Security, peacebuilding and P-CVE

About €248m is allocated to projects falling under the category of security, peacebuilding and P-CVE.

Peacebuilding projects are generally implemented with the involvement of development actors and NGOs. Between €87m and €127m is allocated for this work. Yet between €121m and €161m (around 7% of the total EUTF for Africa budget) is dedicated to working directly with security forces. This group of projects is implemented by Interpol, Civipol, member states' national cooperation agencies, and private and public companies.

While improving security and building capacity to prevent violence is an essential step on the way to achieving sustainable development, it is concerning if flexible emergency instruments are used as an opportunity to fund security forces in third countries over solutions that address legitimate grievances (particularly around democratic processes and rule of law, social accountability, wealth distribution/inequality, gender justice and access to services) or without ensuring a focus on human security.

Human security measures – that is, measures that focus on people's need to be and feel safe and secure in their environment, not on the needs of states – are at the centre of development practice and form the core of the EU's approach to stabilization. The OECD Development Assistance Committee rules make similar distinctions, stating that development cooperation should not be used as a vehicle to promote the provider's security interests. Additional analysis would be required to determine whether the DAC ability of EUTF for Africa security projects is reported accurately.

Importantly, security projects are approved without a duty to include a conflict analysis, or an assessment of their impact on conflict dynamics or on the security, safety and protection needs of different groups.

Development cooperation

Sixty-three percent (or €1,141m) of the EUTF for Africa's approved budget is allocated to funding development cooperation, including ensuring access to basic services, economic opportunities and resilience building (86% of the development cooperation budget); followed by good governance and capacity-building (9%) and protection (5%).

Protection projects primarily target refugees, and to a lesser extent internally displaced persons or other communities. Only 36.5% of EUTF development cooperation projects do not identify beneficiaries based on their migratory status (migrant, refugee, etc.) or on the geographical proximity of the intervention area to migratory routes. In many countries, refugees and migrants are among the most vulnerable people who require urgent assistance. However, the decision to focus strands of funding on these people should be based on context-specific vulnerability and needs assessments, not on European political priorities.

A WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Flexible, multi-year funding, which allows for adaptation and localization, is important for supporting effective responses to crises. But its effectiveness must be ascertained by measuring its contribution to economic opportunities and equal opportunities for all people, and to strengthening the resilience of vulnerable people, human security and development, rather than reductions in migrant numbers, whether at Europe's borders or between African countries.

The EUTF for Africa represents a new aid modality characterized by flexible, pooled funding – an increasingly common trend. Without adequate transparency of decision making processes and accountability measures, it risks becoming an opportunity for European governments to implement political agendas that do not necessarily promote the interests of people in need or aid objectives.

The EUTF for Africa's objective creates a causal link between investment in economic opportunities and equal opportunities for all people, security and development on the one hand, and stability, displacement and migration on the other. But this link is not always immediate and the measurements of success might not be obvious; for example, higher levels of development are often linked with increased migration.³ Further, according to the EU's own standards, '*development interventions in fragile and conflict-affected situations should bear in mind the "do no harm approach" and need to adopt a more context-specific and flexible planning approach, recognising the high risk of failure and the need to quickly adapt to changing situations*'.⁴

To ensure that the EUTF for Africa succeeds in meeting its objectives, **European donors and the EUTF for Africa's Board and Operational Committees should:**

- Ensure that the EUTF contributes to 'promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management,' as per the instrument's objective, by:
 1. Removing any requirement for projects to have a direct effect on migratory flows, in their narrative, objectives or expected results. Projects should be prioritized based on context-specific needs and vulnerability assessments.
 2. Increasing funding for facilitated migration, to 'promote regular channels for migration and mobility from and between European and African countries', in line with the Valletta Action Plan. Both migration and displacement situations must

be managed to increase people's safety and livelihood prospects.

3. Adopt a consultative approach to resilience building, with a specific focus on the rights of minority groups, vulnerable people and the role of women. A strong focus on gender and the inclusion of vulnerable and marginal groups is essential as, at times of crisis, the care and subsistence of the household often relies more heavily and sometimes solely on women.
 4. Provide opportunities for civil society organizations to propose new approaches and projects, based on their experience and expertise in the humanitarian and development fields.
- Protect the integrity of development aid by:
 1. Committing to spend as large a portion as possible of the EUTF for Africa budget on official development assistance (ODA) eligible under the OECD DAC rules. For the sake of transparency and monitoring, the EUTF for Africa should follow the spending rules of its largest source, the EDF. This means spending at least 90% of the EUTF for Africa budget on ODA projects.
 2. Adopting transparent and effective oversight mechanisms, including by facilitating parliamentary reviews of the EUTF for Africa, independently of existing oversight of the EUTF's funding sources.
 3. Establish platforms for civil society engagement, to allow public oversight of key conflict and fragility indicators ('do no harm') in the EUTF for Africa.

The Operational Committees should work to improve the operational dimensions of the fund by:

- Requiring that security interventions and projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations explicitly address the 'do no harm' approach and include conflict sensitivity reviews encompassing analysis and mitigation of potential harm and a gender dimension;
- Requiring that each project include justification for its adoption under an emergency instrument. Projects that require a longer scrutiny and community consultation process should be excluded from the EUTF's rapid approval procedures;
- Making coordination and consultation a regular part of the instrument's operation, including with community representatives, local authorities, civil society (with a particular focus on women's rights organizations) and NGOs;
- Record, for each project, its alignment with national development strategies;
- Conduct regular assessments of the impact of migration management projects on protection of human rights, conflict dynamics and economic markets.

Monitoring bodies with oversight capacity such as OECD DAC and parliamentary committees should:

- Ensure that flexible aid modalities are supplemented by transparent and rigorous reporting and scrutiny, with a specific focus on the migration, security and development nexus, to ensure that development aid goals and principles are respected.

1 INTRODUCTION

In 2015, in response to the dramatic increase in the number of people crossing the Mediterranean to claim asylum in Europe, the European Union adopted its European Agenda on Migration aimed at better managing migration through the implementation of four pillars:

1. Reducing incentives for irregular migration;
2. Stepping up border management, both at the EU's external borders and by supporting third countries to develop their own border management;
3. Reforming the Common European Asylum System;
4. Developing a new policy on legal migration.⁵

While the objective of the European Agenda on Migration was to develop a comprehensive approach,⁶ Oxfam has criticized its implementation, which is failing to achieve this objective.⁷ The EU and its member states have focused their efforts on reducing irregular migration and increasing border management, with very little attempt to increase options for safe and regular migration.

The 'European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa' (EUTF for Africa) was created in connection with this Agenda. It was formally launched at the Valletta Summit on Migration held in November 2015 and is currently planned to run until the end of 2020.⁸ Its objective is to *'support all aspects of stability and contribute to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management'*.⁹

The EUTF for Africa was designed as an emergency instrument,¹⁰ to 'respond to the different dimensions of crisis situations by providing support jointly, flexibly and quickly', complementing political dialogue, development cooperation programmes, humanitarian assistance and crisis response assistance.¹¹ However, given that it was launched in the context of a perceived 'migration crisis', Oxfam and other NGOs have raised concerns that the EUTF for Africa does not include sufficient safeguards to ensure that development aid is not diverted to further the political migration agendas of European countries.

As a humanitarian and development organization guided by a rights-based approach,¹² Oxfam works to ensure that aid is exclusively used to fight poverty, reduce inequality, including gender inequality, and meet humanitarian needs. Development aid, humanitarian assistance and supporting strands of international cooperation have an impact on the lives of hundreds of millions in poverty. They must therefore target those most in need and not fulfil donors' other policy objectives. When aid is given for other purposes, such as donors' short-term, self-interested political agendas, its impact on reducing poverty and its contribution to sustainable development is rarely lasting.

For this report, Oxfam analysed all projects financed from the EUTF for Africa as of the date of writing in October 2017 and divided them into categories in order to assess the influence of European domestic interests on the types of projects implemented under the emergency framework.

The first section presents the main features of the EUTF for Africa: governance, funding and implementation. The second section analyses its objective and narrative around 'root causes'. The third section provides an overview of the different types of projects funded by the EUTF for Africa, and the allocation of funding for each type. Based on this overview, the fourth section sets out an analysis and raises concerns. The last section contains a conclusion and recommendations.

Trust funds are at the forefront of the European response to complex humanitarian and development situations abroad. This research aims to contribute to their transparency and accountability, and lead the debate on the future of development aid and new funding modalities.

2 THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE EUTF FOR AFRICA

Governance

Trust Funds are a specific type of EU instrument. They are created to respond to emergency, post-emergency or thematic actions for a limited duration.¹³ They have specific governance arrangements and are placed outside the EU budget.¹⁴

The EUTF for Africa is structured around a Strategic Board, which sets the general strategy, and three Regional Operational Committees for the three geographic windows of Horn of Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad, and North Africa.¹⁵ Each Operational Committee approves programmes for their respective geographic window.

The Strategic Board and the Regional Operational Committees are all chaired by the European Commission and include representatives from the European External Action Service, member states and other donors¹⁶ that have contributed more than €3m to the EUTF for Africa. Partner countries in Africa, regional organizations in Africa and donors contributing less than €3m are granted observer status without voting rights.

The legal basis of the EUTF allows for fast decision making that falls outside the traditional procedures, due to its emergency nature. The EUTF for Africa projects are generally proposed under the leadership of the EU Delegations and then selected by members of the Regional Operational Committees.


By contrast to conventional EU development instruments, the European Parliament does not have oversight of the EUTF for Africa.

Funding

This EUTF for Africa is a pooled fund of different EU funding instruments, mainly the European Development Fund, the EU budget, and contributions from member states and other donors. As of October 2017, about €3.157bn had been pledged to the EUTF for Africa.¹⁷

Seventy-three percent of the fund (about €2,290m) comes from the EDF, which is the main source of EU development aid for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the overseas territories. This contribution represents almost 8% of the EDF's total resources (€30.5bn), for all the countries it covers, between 2014 and 2020.¹⁸

Figure 2: EUTF for Africa funding sources



Twenty percent of the EUTF for Africa comes from the EU budget,¹⁹ as follows: 10% (€313m) from the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which covers both geographic and thematic development intervention for a total budget of €19.6bn for the 2014–2020 period.²⁰ Seven percent (about €226m) comes from the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which supports development and cooperation with the 16 countries covered by European Neighbourhood Policy funding (for a total budget of over €15.4bn).²¹ Finally, 1.5% of the EUTF for Africa's budget comes from the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) and 1.5% from the DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO).

Seven percent comes from member states' contributions and other donors.^{22,23}

Implementation

By October 2017, almost two years after its implementation, 117 projects have been contracted across the three EUTF windows for a total amount of €1.9bn.²⁴

Table 1: EUTF for Africa by window²⁵

| | Budget (in millions) | Percentage of total budget |
|---|----------------------|----------------------------|
| Sahel and Lake Chad Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal | €1,001.8 | 52% |
| Horn of Africa Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda | €665.0 | 34.5% |
| North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia | €264.7 | 13.5% |
| Total | €1,931.5 | 100% |

Each project within the EUTF for Africa operates along one or more strategic lines of action, correlating to the priorities of the Action Plan adopted during the Valletta Summit on Migration.²⁶

The allocation of projects to each strategic line is detailed in the 2016 Annual Report of the EUTF for Africa²⁷ but Oxfam's research reveals that the reporting is often insufficient.²⁸ For example, projects relating to several strategic lines of action have been arbitrarily assigned to only one line of action, leading to an over-representation of the line of action supporting 'greater economic and employment objectives', while under-representing the other strategic lines of actions, especially migration management.²⁹

3 A FLAWED NARRATIVE

The EUTF for Africa's comprehensive character is well-noted in its objective, to 'support all aspects of stability and contribute to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management'.³⁰

However, within the political context of the European migration agenda, there has been little clarity as to the expected measures that the emergency trust fund would support. The linkage made between stability, forced displacement and irregular migration – three different phenomena – has not been explained. Nor is it clear how a flexible emergency instrument will be used to address all three issues. In particular, obscurity around the plans for the EUTF for Africa and the possibility that it will be influenced by political pressure has raised the following questions:

- The 'root causes' of migration and forced displacement are often entirely different. Does the EUTF for Africa make the appropriate distinctions in its projects?
- What is the impact of pooling development aid together with supplemental funding sources? Does it dilute or support development cooperation's primary objective of reducing and eradicating poverty?
- Is the flexibility and urgency of the EUTF for Africa beneficial for all the projects it funds?
- Finally, if the EUTF for Africa is proved to be mixing development cooperation with European political priorities, is this reported adequately to monitoring bodies such as the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)?

THE 'ROOT CAUSES' NARRATIVE: THE MANY REASONS FOR CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT

The EUTF for Africa is designed to address the root causes of 'forced displacement and irregular migration', but this objective is rooted in a misunderstanding about the different motivations that prompt people to move between regions and countries.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as the '*movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries*'.³¹ Yet the reasons for which people move across borders have little to do with their regulatory status. The phenomenon of *migration* is part of human nature. Individuals' ability to travel across borders to engage in trade and labour is important for their own economic resilience, as well as that of their families and communities back home who benefit from remittances.

Forced displacement is entirely different. It is caused by situations from which people flee, such as conflicts, persecution, violations of rights or disasters. At the root of forced displacement, then, lie instability, inequality, poor governance, corruption, climate change and inadequate disaster responses.

Development cooperation should aim to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration,³² as an alternative to irregular migration. Measures designed to restrict irregular migration or weaken incentives for it will only make migration more costly and unsafe, if the overall result is to reduce mobility options. Indeed, the priority of African regional bodies in respect to migration governance is to maintain free movement, not restrict it or classify it as irregular. This is the case for the African Union,³³ the Economic Community of West African States,³⁴ the East African Community,³⁵ the Southern African Development Community³⁶ and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.³⁷

As for forced displacement, its 'root causes' should be addressed by donors, but with the aim of supporting all those affected by crises, not only those who are able to flee. Emergency support in situations of displacement should be provided based on need, not on distinctions of migratory status (recognized refugees, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers, etc.), to ensure that displaced persons are protected and that their needs are addressed.

DEVELOPMENT AID WITHIN A MIGRATION AGENDA

The EU has clear rules, enshrined in the EU treaties, for the development aid it delivers: the primary objective of development aid should be poverty reduction and, in the long term, poverty eradication.³⁸ Since the vast majority of the EUTF for Africa funding comes from development aid instruments, most EUTF projects must fulfil this objective. Nevertheless, the EUTF for Africa is a fungible instrument, meaning no project can be directly connected to a specific source of funding (i.e. EDF, DG ECHO, DG HOME, etc.).

How does the fungible nature of the EUTF for Africa affect approaches to promoting 'resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management' in line with the EUTF for Africa's objective? Are projects designed to support development objectives, and can the EUTF for Africa's success be measured according to its contribution to development goals? Or has the political focus on stemming irregular migration to Europe meant that its success is instead measured by the numbers of people arriving irregularly in Europe?

A flexible emergency instrument: A double-edged sword

The response to instability and disasters can benefit greatly from urgent support but, when subject to political pressure, an emergency mechanism can also serve to bypass much-needed consultation and maturation.

The approval of projects funded under the EUTF for Africa is designed to begin and conclude within a short timeframe. Projects are discussed and agreed upon before meetings of the Operational Committees. African governments have no official role in the procedure, despite partnership being one of the five fundamental principles set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.³⁹ While they are able to comment on projects in Committee meetings in their observer role, the process gives European donors clear priority in determining the nature of the projects and, subsequently, of the EUTF for Africa.

Yet, some projects could benefit more from a consultative and inclusive process than from rapid development and implementation. Without sufficient oversight, public engagement and consultation, including local stakeholders, some projects may even be counterproductive to development goals of inclusive growth, democracy and human rights.

For example, civil registration can often promote development goals by enabling governments to better analyse population trends and needs. However, it is highly questionable whether there is any benefit in implementing biometric identification systems under an emergency instrument. Biometric identification systems are often controversial, and require thorough consideration. Yet, European governments consider them necessary to facilitate quicker identification and returns of irregular migrants to their countries of origin.⁴⁰ Such projects are implemented in Mali and Senegal, but it is not clear why they have been adopted under an emergency instrument rather than through long-term support for national development plans.

Insufficient reporting and accountability mechanisms

Effective reporting is critical to understanding how aid is being used and whether it is meeting the goals of poverty reduction and eradication. Yet, in conducting this research, Oxfam identified several challenges in terms of reporting within the EUTF for Africa.

First, due to the instrument's fungible nature, it is unclear whether EUTF for Africa spending complies with the rules that establish, for each fund, how much of it should be counted as official development assistance (ODA). Aggregating the various rules which apply to each funding source (EDF, DCI, ENI, etc.) would not allow sufficient transparency, as the proportion of each source in the EUTF is relative and may change regularly.

Second, the current OECD DAC reporting rules and guidance are not sufficiently detailed when it comes to activities related to migration. The ongoing development by OECD DAC of a specific reporting code for 'migration and mobility facilitation' and adjustment of other reporting codes linked to migration-related activities (e.g. population policy and administrative management; legal and judicial development; human rights) should help to clarify what can and cannot be counted as ODA.⁴¹

Finally, the European Parliament, and its Development Committee in particular, has no official role in monitoring the EUTF for Africa and is not given the space to provide input or meaningfully supervise the way European resources are spent.

4 THE FINDINGS:

CATEGORIZATION OF PROJECTS BY PURPOSE

To answer the questions presented in Section 3, Oxfam has undertaken an in-depth analysis of the EUTF for Africa, placing each approved project into one of four categories. The research also reviews, to the extent possible, the approach taken by each project to establish linkages between migration, security and development.

METHODOLOGY

Oxfam allocated each EUTF for Africa project to one of four categories:

1. Migration management;
2. Security, peacebuilding, preventing and countering violent extremism (P-CVE);
3. Development cooperation;
4. Research and monitoring.

The allocation was based on each project's declared objective, results and indicators, as reported to the European Commission. When a project included several separate activities, sub-objectives and budget lines, each segment of the project and its respective budget line was allocated to one of the four categories independently.

While many projects provided detailed budget lines, others did not provide detailed information on their budgets.⁴² Despite this lack of transparency in reporting, Oxfam has been able to categorize 114 projects (worth a total of €1.817m). Three projects⁴³ have been excluded from our reporting because of the absence of a programme description at the time of writing this report.⁴⁴

All the projects were contracted between the inception of the EUTF for Africa in November 2015 and the time of writing, in October 2017.

The category definitions are explained below.

Category 1: Migration management

Projects relating to migration management can be divided into five subcategories:

- **Migration containment and control** includes legislation change for better migration management and the fight against the smuggling of migrants. It also comprises capacity building, such as border control and police training within a migration context as well as collection of data on migration.
- **Policy reforms for returns** includes policy reforms to facilitate return, readmission and reintegration as well as the actual implementation of returns. It excludes projects aimed at creating economic opportunities for returnees.

- **Population registration systems** includes projects to strengthen civil registration systems and collect biometric measurements.⁴⁵
- **Awareness raising** includes projects to raise awareness about the dangers of irregular migration and the alternatives to it.
- **Facilitated migration**⁴⁶ includes projects to create new opportunities for regular migration.

Category 2: Security, peacebuilding and preventing/countering violent extremism (P-CVE)

This category includes projects designed to promote peace and security, and fight or counter violent extremism.

Projects within this category can have a wide variety of objectives, including reducing tensions between refugees and host communities; demining; strengthening young people's conflict management skills; but also increasing the capacity of security forces.

Projects which support security forces to manage borders with a declared objective to manage migration were included in the 'migration management' category. For example, the project supporting the G5 Sahel was partly allocated to migration management (Category 1) and partly to security (Category 2). However, migration management appears in the narratives and justification of some projects assigned to Category 2, even when it is not one of the objectives or results.

For example, the main objective of a project in Mali is '*to contribute to the strengthening of the rule of law in this zone by allowing an increased and effective presence of Malian Security Forces*'.⁴⁷ Yet, it justifies its intervention based on, *inter alia*, the need to '*effectively combat irregular migration and manage regular migration*'.⁴⁸

Category 3: Development cooperation

This category can be divided into three subcategories:

- **Basic services, economic opportunities and resilience building** includes projects aimed at improving access and delivery of basic services (shelter, water and sanitation, education, etc.), strengthening livelihoods and increasing economic opportunities through agricultural support or job creation. It also includes projects to improve individual and community resilience to disasters.
- **Protection** includes projects aimed at improving the protection of people in need against violations of their rights, including by providing access to (informal and formal) justice mechanisms.
- **Good governance and capacity building** includes projects aimed at strengthening the ability of governments and local authorities to develop policies and to provide services in an accountable manner.

Category 4: Research and monitoring

This category includes projects to carry out research into causes of forced displacement and migration, fund technical cooperation facilities that have a declared aim of monitoring implementation and results, and monitor and evaluate projects aimed at assessing the EUTF itself.

RESULTS BY CATEGORY

According to our findings, nearly a quarter (22%) of the EUTF for Africa budget is going to migration management and 13.5% is being allocated to security, peacebuilding, security and P-CVE projects. Sixty-three percent is being spent on development cooperation, while 1.5% is funding research and monitoring projects.

Table 2: Categorization of the EUTF for Africa (rounded figures)

| Category | Budget (in millions) | Percentage of total EUTF budget |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Migration management | €400.02 | 22.0% |
| Security, peacebuilding, and P-CVE | €248.00 | 13.6% |
| Development cooperation | €1,140.86 | 63.0% |
| Research and monitoring | €28.30 | 1.6% |
| Total | €1,817.19 | 100% |

Category 1: Migration management

Migration management projects account for almost a quarter of the EUTF for Africa budget (22% of the total budget, representing about €400m). This amount is allocated across 29 out of 114 projects.

Based on the information available, two of the three projects excluded from this research are also related to migration management. If this understanding is correct, the amount allocated to migration management would rise to €502m (26% of the total).⁴⁹

Migration management is mainly implemented in the Sahel window and the North Africa window, where it represents 25% and 40% of the budget, respectively. It accounts for just 13% of the budget in the Horn of Africa.

Within the category of migration management, most projects are designed to restrict and discourage irregular migration through migration containment and control (55%), raising awareness about the dangers of irregular migration (4%), as well as implementing policy reforms for returns (25%) and improving identification of countries' nationals (13%). Only a meagre 3% of the budget is allocated to developing, or supporting African authorities to develop, safe and regular routes.

Table 3: Migration management

| Subcategory | Budget (in millions) | Percentage |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| Migration containment and control | €221.40 | 55% |
| Policy reforms for returns | €98.50 | 25% |
| Population registration systems | €53.00 | 13% |
| Awareness raising | €16.10 | 4% |
| Facilitated migration | €11.00 | 3% |
| Total | €400.00 | 100% |

Category 2: Security, peacebuilding and P-CVE

About 13.2% of the budget of the EUTF for Africa (€248m) is allocated to projects falling under this category.

Two types of projects can be distinguished within the category. One involves implementation in communities and with their participation, with the aim of increasing a sense of security at the local level and reducing the risk of violence. Between €87m and €127m is allocated to this work.

However, between €121m and €161m (around 7% of the total EUTF for Africa budget) is dedicated to working directly with security forces at the national or international level. This group of projects is implemented by Interpol, Civipol, member states' national cooperation agencies, and private and public companies.

Category 3: Development cooperation

Sixty-three percent of the EUTF for Africa's budget (€1,141m) is allocated to development cooperation, across three-quarters of the projects (84 of 114).

Most of the budget is allocated to projects that involve an element of increasing access to basic services, developing economic opportunities and building resilience (86% of the budget under Category 3), followed by good governance and capacity-building (9%) and protection (5%). Most of the development projects also address gender issues, either by including a minimum number of women beneficiaries or by having a particular focus on women. Of the 84 projects, only eight do not have any gender perspective.

The three windows differ greatly in the types of projects implemented. The Horn of Africa is most heavily focused on access to basic services, economic opportunities and resilience building (with 91% of its projects in this category) followed by the Sahel (87%) and North Africa (45%).

There are almost no protection projects in the Sahel (1% of the projects in this category) and very few in the Horn of Africa (5%). Most of these projects are implemented in the North Africa window (35%).

The North Africa window also leads in good governance projects (with 20% of its projects in this category), followed by the Sahel (12%) and the Horn of Africa (4%). Further context-specific analysis is required in order to examine the effectiveness and impact of such projects, especially in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Category 4: Research and monitoring

There are six projects approved under this category, accounting for 1.5% of the total budget. Three of the six projects are to fund technical cooperation facilities, with the aim of supporting more effective implementation of the EUTF for Africa.

RESULTS BY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

The European Migration Partnership Framework⁵⁰ identifies countries in Africa based on whether migrants, including refugees, originate from them (countries of origin) or pass through them (countries of transit) on their way to Europe. The same information appears in several EUTF project action fiches. This migration-based division has a clear impact on the types of projects approved under the EUTF for Africa.

Aggregating the budgets for all countries of origin (Somalia, South Sudan, Eritrea, Gambia, Nigeria, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire), most of the budget (77% or €203m), is allocated to development cooperation projects. Roughly 13% of the budget (€33m) is allocated to migration management. None of the projects relating to security, peacebuilding and P-CVE (10% or €27m) support security forces.

In countries of transit (Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Libya), only 54% of the budget is allocated to development cooperation (€288m), while 33% (€176m) is spent on migration management projects. Half of projects relating to security, peacebuilding and P-CVE (13% or €67m) support security forces.

Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal, Sudan and Morocco are identified as countries of both origin and transit. In these countries, the allocation to development projects is high and similar to countries of origin, at 79% (€436m), although migration management accounts for a higher percentage than in countries of origin, at 15% (€83.5m). All projects relating to security, peacebuilding and CVE support security forces (with €29m or 5%) rather than building the capacity of local communities.

These results indicate that long-term development projects are mainly implemented in countries of origin and are far less present in countries of transit. Migration management and support for security forces are mainly implemented in countries considered by the EU as countries of transit. The implication of these results will be analysed in the next section.

5 ANALYSIS

The EUTF for Africa is a complex instrument that aims to address a variety of issues. In conducting the research for this report, it was easy to identify many projects designed to benefit vulnerable populations, including displaced persons. However, it was equally easy to identify the influence of the European political agenda on migration on the narrative and overall direction of the instrument.

Concerns relating to individual projects or the balance between types of projects are noted below.

MIGRATION MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY FORCES

A short-sighted vision of migration management

As noted above, only 3% of EUTF for Africa migration management budget concerns facilitated migration. This approach of investing primarily in stopping irregular migration, with insufficient investment in opening more safe and regular mobility pathways – both within Africa and towards Europe – will fail to achieve either development or migration-related policy goals. Restricting irregular migration will not lead to a reduction in migration, but rather will force migrants to resort to taking more dangerous routes. This is recognized by the European Commission, which has stated that *‘new routes are more difficult to use and riskier, leading to higher prices demanded by the smugglers for transport, and higher risks for the migrants’*.⁵¹

An imbalanced approach will fail to ‘facilitat[e] orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’, as recommended by target 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals. It also calls into question the commitment of European donors to implementing the second pillar of the Valletta Action Plan, on Legal Migration and Mobility, including by ‘promoting regular channels for migration and mobility from and between European and African countries’.⁵²

A securitized approach to emergency aid

Eight projects (between €121m and €161m, accounting for 7–9% of the total budget) support security forces in the Sahel and Horn of Africa.

While improving security and building capacity to prevent violence is an essential step on the way to achieving sustainable development, it is concerning if flexible emergency instruments are used as an opportunity to fund security forces in third countries over solutions that address legitimate grievances (particularly around democratic processes and the rule of law, social accountability, wealth distribution/inequality, gender justice and access to services) or without ensuring a focus on human security. Some studies⁵³ refer to the dangers of activities around countering violent extremism. The OECD DAC rules make a similar distinction, stating that *‘development cooperation should not be used as a vehicle to promote the provider’s security*

*interests*⁵⁴ and should not be reportable as ODA, except in exceptional circumstances, in direct connection to a humanitarian or development service.

Human security measures are at the centre of development practice and form the core of the EU's approach to stabilization. '*The EU's own stability is built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness*'⁵⁵ and its approach to security must be based on assessing, in a participatory way, the security, safety and protection needs of different groups, including the specific needs of women, minors and minority groups.

Currently, security projects are approved without a duty to include a conflict analysis, or an assessment of their impact on conflict dynamics or on the security, safety and protection needs of different groups.

The crucial role of the migration route

The focus of European governments on stopping irregular migration towards Europe is diverting attention towards people on the move along the Central Mediterranean route. In some places, this attention inadvertently benefits people in need, by providing much-needed urgent assistance. But in other places, the flexibility given to donors may result in emergency situations being overlooked.

For example, Niger, an important country of transit, was positioned 187 out of 188 countries on the human development index (a composite index of life expectancy, education and per capita income) in 2015.⁵⁶ It is facing a humanitarian crisis in its south-eastern regions nearest Lake Chad, and migration is not included in its development priorities or National Indicative Programmes (NIPs). Yet, under the EUTF for Africa, eight out of nine projects justify their intervention based on the need to target migratory routes or migrants themselves, and only one project has been approved in connection to the Lake Chad Basin crisis. In June 2016, more than 120 NGOs called for EU leaders to reject its migration plan that serves the single objective of curbing migration.⁵⁷ This concern has been echoed in other studies into the EUTF for Africa in relation to Niger.⁵⁸

Oxfam's research has found that the EUTF for Africa shows a preference for projects in specific regions or for addressing specific beneficiaries based on their perceived role in migratory movement. Of the 84 projects implementing activities related to development cooperation, 49 projects (63% of the budget allocated to development cooperation) justify their intervention on the basis of either (1) geographical proximity to areas from which migrants may originate or pass through, or (2) selection of beneficiaries based on migratory status (migrant, refugee, etc.).

Thirty-three of the total 84 projects, representing 36.5% of the budget allocated to development, do not refer to migration as a selection criterion; rather citing the area of intervention and the selection of beneficiaries based solely on needs (vulnerability, gender, etc.). Two projects did not provide enough information to be assessed.

While migrants and displaced people are often vulnerable and in need of urgent assistance, best development practice requires donors to work towards eradicating poverty and to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches by considering both the needs of potential beneficiaries and external context dynamics. While

EU migration-defined targeting may *unintentionally* overlap with these considerations, the EUTF for Africa should assess the best approaches to promoting resilience, economic opportunities, equal opportunities for all people, security and development, in line with its objective.

Reporting on mobility control

The narrative according to which development projects can serve to curb migration flows does not remain at the instrument level; it trickles into the objectives and indicators of several projects. For example, the main objective of a regional project in the Sahel aimed at developing the handicraft sector is to '*contribute to poverty reduction and consequently to the settlement of populations and the reduction of irregular migration (especially to Europe)*'.⁵⁹ Similarly, the main objective of a project in Senegal is to '*improve living conditions in rural areas to reduce illegal emigration, tackle poverty and support the resilience of populations*'.⁶⁰ One of its main indicators is the '*Reduction of the % of migration in the zone of intervention*'.

This framing risks undermining development objectives if it results in skewing local markets and negatively impacting sustainable development efforts on the ground.

A positive contribution

Despite certain problematic approaches, the EUTF for Africa also supports many positive initiatives that should be further explored and built on as a way of bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and longer term development, building the resilience of the most vulnerable populations, creating economic opportunities and increasing participation in local governance. As situations of forced displacement are increasingly becoming protracted, both humanitarian and development support is required.

Oxfam is implementing four programmes funded by the EUTF for Africa, in Chad, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Mali. The objective of these programmes is to provide communities and households with a larger pool of capital and livelihood options to make them less vulnerable, and better able to cope with and recover from stresses and shocks. Many other NGOs are involved in the implementation of similar projects. The experience of Oxfam and other organizations should be taken into account when new projects are developed.

Yet, if Europe is to increase its commitment to addressing resilience, development, displacement and support for safe migration, it is crucial that funding allocated to programmes specifically targeting migrants or migratory routes *is additional* to budgets to meet urgent humanitarian needs and existing development aid commitments in line with national poverty reduction strategies.

This need for separate, additional funding cannot be substituted by increasing the flexibility of development instruments such as the EUTF for Africa, which simply risks depleting the resources needed to fight poverty and inequality.

6 A WAY FORWARD AND CONCLUSIONS

The EUTF for Africa is a new instrument which responds to the fragmentation of existing EU and member state funding by providing a rapid and flexible source of funds. Flexibility and rapid response enable donors to improve complementarity and cooperation between humanitarian and development interventions.

However, this approach of mixing funds and adopting flexible ways of operating can also be manipulated to promote internal political agendas if it lacks sufficient accountability, supervision and consultation. It increases anxiety among implementing partners, who are unsure whether they will continue to have a mandate to implement projects guided by input from communities and by needs and protection assessments.

A politically driven sense of urgency in Europe was the *raison d'être* of the EUTF for Africa and is determining too many aspects of its implementation. But this does not mean that the instrument's daily operations are doomed to fail. What is needed is a clear and firm separation between the political interests that led to the establishment of the EUTF for Africa and the operational dimensions of the EUTF windows.

The EUTF for Africa's objective creates a causal link between investment in economic and equal opportunities for all people, security and development on the one hand, and stability, displacement and migration on the other. But this link is not always immediate and the measurements of success might not be obvious; for example, higher levels of development are often linked with increased migration.⁶¹ Further, according to the EU's own standards, *'development interventions in fragile and conflict-affected situations should bear in mind the "do no harm approach" and need to adopt a more context-specific and flexible planning approach, recognising the high risk of failure and the need to quickly adapt to changing situations'*.⁶²

Migration is a complex phenomenon that can be managed for the benefit of migrants and displaced people as well as countries of origin, transit and destination. To ensure this, flexible funding must be balanced with adequate accountability mechanisms, in line with humanitarian and development aid principles.

While urgent crisis-response contributions can be measured at a project level quite soon after the intervention in order to assess their impact, they should not be selected for or expected to immediately impact the overall security, displacement and migration situations in all the countries of operation. Rather, the effectiveness of the EUTF for Africa should be measured by its overall contribution to the gradual transition from humanitarian to development interventions, and improvement of the security and economic situation in the countries in which it operates.

To ensure that the EUTF for Africa succeeds in meeting its objectives, **European donors, and the EUTF for Africa's Board and Operational Committees should:**

- Ensure that the EUTF contributes to 'promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management,' as per the instrument's objective, by:
 1. Removing any requirement for projects to have a direct effect on migratory flows in their narrative, objectives or expected results. Projects should be prioritized based on context-specific needs and vulnerability assessments;
 2. Increasing funding for facilitated migration, to 'promote regular channels for migration and mobility from and between European and African countries', in line with the Valletta Action Plan. Both migration and displacement situations must be managed to increase people's safety and livelihood prospects;
 3. Adopt a consultative approach to resilience building, with a specific focus on the rights of minority groups, vulnerable people and the role of women. A strong focus on gender and inclusion of vulnerable and marginal groups is essential as, at times of crisis, the care and subsistence of the household often relies more heavily and sometimes solely on women;
 4. Provide opportunities for civil society organizations to propose new approaches and projects, based on their experience and expertise in the humanitarian and development fields.
- Protect the integrity of development aid by:
 1. Committing to spend as large a portion as possible of the EUTF for Africa budget on ODA eligible under the OECD DAC rules. For the sake of transparency and monitoring, the EUTF for Africa should follow the spending rules of its largest source, the EDF. This means spending at least 90% of the EUTF for Africa budget on ODA projects.
 2. Adopting transparent and effective oversight mechanisms, including by facilitating parliamentary reviews of the EUTF for Africa, independently of existing oversight of the EUTF's funding sources.
 3. Establish platforms for civil society engagement, to allow public oversight of key conflict and fragility indicators ('do no harm') in the EUTF for Africa.

The Operational Committees should work to improve the operational dimensions of the fund, by:

- Requiring that security interventions and projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations explicitly address the 'do no harm' approach and include conflict sensitivity reviews encompassing analysis and mitigation of potential harm and a gender dimension;
- Requiring that each project include justification for its adoption under an emergency instrument. Projects that require a longer scrutiny and community consultation process should be excluded from the EUTF's rapid approval procedures;

- Making coordination and consultation a regular part of the instrument's operation, including with community representatives, local authorities, civil society (with a particular focus on women's rights organizations), and NGOs;
- Record, for each project, its alignment with national development strategies;
- Conduct regular assessments of the impact of migration management projects on protection of human rights, conflict dynamics and economic markets.

Monitoring bodies with oversight capacity such as OECD DAC and parliamentary committees should:

- Ensure that flexible aid modalities are supplemented by transparent and rigorous reporting and scrutiny, with a specific focus on the migration, security and development nexus, to ensure that development aid goals and principles are respected.

NOTES

- 1 European Commission. *Governance and Procedure: EU Trust Fund for Africa for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_governance_final_en.pdf
- 2 European Commission (5 February 2016). *Strategic orientation document: the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*.
- 3 H. de Haas (2010). Migration transitions: a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the developmental drivers of international migration. Working Paper. International Migration Institute. University of Oxford. <https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/wp-24-10>
- 4 Council of the European Union (19 May 2017). *Council Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus*. (9417/17).
- 5 European Commission (13 May 2015). *A European Agenda on Migration*. Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
- 6 *A European Agenda on Migration*. Op. cit.
- 7 R. Shilhav (2017). *Beyond 'Fortress Europe'. Principles for a humane EU migration policy*. Oxfam. <https://oxf.am/2xXaNI0>
- 8 An action plan with five priority domains was launched at the Valletta Summit in November 2015: (1) Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; (2) Enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility; (3) Reinforce the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; (4) Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; (5) Return, readmission and reintegration. See: Valletta Summit on Migration (11–12 November 2015). Action Plan.

On the links between the EUTF for Africa and the European migration agenda see: Council of the EU, Foreign Affairs and International Relations (12 May 2016). *Council conclusions on the EU approach to forced displacement and development*.
- 9 European Commission (5 February 2016). *Strategic orientation document: the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-revised-strategy-15022016_en.pdf
- 10 European Commission. *Governance and Procedure: EU Trust Fund for Africa for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_governance_final_en.pdf
- 11 'Improved resilience should reduce violence and risk-taking behaviour. By bringing together political dialogue, peacebuilding, principled humanitarian aid and development priorities through a comprehensive and coherent approach, better results will be achieved on the ground. Furthermore, moving from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development processes should empower populations and institutions alike both in areas of protracted displacement as well as areas of return.' See: European Commission (5 February 2016). *Strategic orientation document: the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*.
- 12 The rights-based approach to development is a way of thinking about, designing and managing development programmes guided by the legal standards defined in international human rights treaties and conventions, and the values and principles that inform them. See: Oxfam. (2014). *Quick Guide to Rights-based Approaches to Development*. <https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/quick-guide-to-rights-based-approaches-to-development-312421>
- 13 European Commission (2017). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Court of Auditors: Annual accounts of the European Development Fund 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/FED/FED_2016_en.pdf
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 European Commission (2016). *Annual Report: The Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_2016_annual_report_final_en.pdf
- 16 Twenty-five of the 28 EU member states (all but Croatia, Cyprus and Greece) and two non-EU donors (Norway and Switzerland) have pledged: Austria (€6m), Belgium (€10m), Bulgaria (€0.05m), Czech Republic (€1.6m), Denmark (€6m), Estonia (€1.5m), Finland (€5m), France (€3m), Germany (€51m), Hungary (€0.7m), Ireland (€3m), Italy (€102m), Latvia (€0.05m), Lithuania (€0.05m), Luxembourg (€3.1m), Malta (€0.25m), Netherlands (€16.3m), Norway (€3.6m), Poland (€1.1m), Portugal (€0.45m), Romania (€0.1m), Slovakia (€0.6m), Slovenia (€0.05m), Spain (€3m), Sweden (€3m), Switzerland (€4.1m) and the UK (€3m). See: European Commission (3 October 2017). *EU Member States and other donors*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu_ms_and_other_donors_contributions.pdf
- 17 European Commission (3 October 2017). *EU Pledges per window*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/eu-pledges-window-eutf-africa_en.

- 18 European Parliament (2014). *European Development Fund - Joint development cooperation and the EU budget: out or in?* <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/1079>
- 19 European Commission (3 October 2017). *EU Contributions*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu_contributions_1.pdf
- 20 European Commission. *Development Cooperation Instrument*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci_en.htm_en
- 21 European Parliament Research Service Blog (2016). *How the EU Budget Is Spent: European Neighbourhood Instrument*. <https://epthinktank.eu/2016/11/22/how-the-eu-budget-is-spent-european-neighbourhood-instrument/>
- 22 European Commission (3 October 2017). *EU Member States and other donors*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu_ms_and_other_donors_contributions.pdf
- 23 European Commission. *Governance and Procedure: EU Trust Fund for Africa for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_governance_final_en.pdf
- 24 European Commission (3 October 2017). *Commitments and Payments*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 The four strategic lines of action are: (1) Greater economic and employment opportunities; (2) Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people; (3) Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination in line with the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility; (4) Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration. See: European Commission (2016). *Annual Report: The Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*.
- 27 European Commission (2016). *Annual Report: The Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*.
- 28 There are three problems with the reporting method described in the 2016 Annual Report of the EUTF: (1) Projects fulfilling several strategic lines of action were arbitrarily assigned to the first strategic line of action, leading to an over-representation of 'greater economic and employment objectives', and under-representation of the other strategic lines of action, especially 'migration management'; (2) All projects within the North Africa window report to migration management as stipulated in the strategic orientation document of the EUTF, although in practice that is not the case for several projects or activities; (3) The assignment of a type of project to a specific strategic line of action is sometimes problematic; for example, civil registration within the EUTF for Africa context relates more to migration management, as it facilitates returns, than governance building. Raising awareness about the danger of irregular migration is not the same as promoting regular migration.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 European Commission (5 February 2016). *Strategic orientation document: the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-revised-strategy-15022016_en.pdf
- 31 International Organization for Migration. *Key Migration Terms*. <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>
- 32 Sustainable Development Goal 10.7. 'Facilitate orderly, safe and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.'
- 33 African Union (23 February 2017). *Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council. 661th Meeting*. PSC/PR/COMM.1(DCLXI). <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/661-psc-comm-23-02-2017free-movement-of-people-final.pdf>
- 34 ECOWAS/979 Protocol A/P.1/5/79 relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment. http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/PROTOCOL%20RELATING%20TO%20%20FREE%20MOVEMENT%20OF%20PERSONS.pdf
- 35 East African Community (2009). *Protocol on the establishment of the East African Community Common Market*. http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/PROTOCOL%20RELATING%20TO%20%20FREE%20MOVEMENT%20OF%20PERSONS.pdf
- 36 Southern African Development Community (2005). *Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons*. http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/Protocol_on_Facilitation_of_Movement_of_Persons2005.pdf
- 37 IGAD (2012). *IGAD discusses a draft protocol on free movement of persons*. https://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=479:igad-discusses-

- 38 Treaty of Lisbon. Article 208.
- 39 'Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption'. See: OECD. *Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action*. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>
- 40 European Commission (2 March 2016). *Third Progress Report on the Partnership Framework*. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/com_2017_205_f1_report_from_commission_en_v8_p1_880005_0.pdf
- 41 OECD DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (2017). *Proposed new purpose code for "migration and mobility facilitation"*. [http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT\(2017\)23&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD/DAC/STAT(2017)23&docLanguage=En)
- 42 For example, the budget lines for the project EUTF-NOA-LY-03 'Managing mixed migration flows in Libya through expanding protection space and supporting local socioeconomic development' are very limited. The same applies to EUTF-NOA-LY-02 'Supporting protection and humanitarian repatriation and reintegration of vulnerable migrants in Libya'.
- 43 Three projects have been excluded from this analysis: EUTF-NOA-EG-01 (subject to further consultation with the Egyptian authorities), EUTF-NOA-LY-04 (at an early stage) and EUTF-HOA-SS-05 (under review).
- 44 October 2017.
- 45 In the Valletta Action Plan (supra), civil registry systems are mentioned as a tool for migration management and their absence as one of the main difficulties in the application of return and readmission policies. On the links between biometric population registries in third countries and the European Agenda on Migration, see: European Commission (14 December 2016). *Annex to the Second Progress Report: First Deliverables on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration*. p. 4; European Commission. *Framework Contract for Technical and Support Services (TSS) in the field of Irregular migration and Legal migration*. (HOME/2016/AMIF/FW/MIGR/0012) p. 4.
- 46 IOM defines the term as 'Fostering or encouraging of regular migration by making travel easier and more convenient. This may take the form of a streamlined visa application process, or efficient and well-staffed passenger inspection procedures.' See: IOM. *Key Migration Terms*. <https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>
- 47 EUTF-SAH-ML-06. *Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et de Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières (PARSEC Mopti-Gao)*. See <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/t05-eutf-sah-ml-06.pdf>
- 48 Ibid. Translation from French: 'Pour lutter efficacement contre la migration irrégulière et maîtriser la migration régulière'.
- 49 The first two projects seem to belong to the 'migration management' category: EUTF-NOA-EG-01 (Enhancing the response to Migration Challenges in Egypt, €60m), EUTF-NOA-LY-04 (Integrated migration and border management, €42.3m) and EUTF-HOA-SS-05 (Support to strengthening public financial management for the transparent and responsible use of resources, €12m).
- 50 For example: The European Commission (13 June 2016). *Fourth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework*. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/4th_progress_report_partnership_framework_with_third_countries_under_european_agenda_on_migration.pdf
- 51 European Commission (13 June 2016). *Fourth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework*. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/4th_progress_report_partnership_framework_with_third_countries_under_european_agenda_on_migration.pdf
- 52 The Valletta Action Plan.
- 53 Inter alia: Saferworld. *Shouldn't YOU be Countering Violent Extremism?* <https://saferworld-indepth.squarespace.com/shouldnt-you-be-countering-violent-extremism>
- 54 OECD (8 April 2016). *Converged statistical reporting directives for the creditor reporting system (CRS) and the annual DAC questionnaire*. P 25.
- 55 European Commission (2015). *Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. Brussels, 18.11.2015 JOIN (2015) 50 final. See: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf
- 56 UNDP (2016). *Human Development for Everyone: Briefing note for countries on the 2016 Human Development Report: Niger*.

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NER.pdf

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For further information on the issues raised in this paper please email advocacy@oxfaminternational.org

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